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Observers familiar with the history of internationallending
approach the "debt crisis" of the 1980s with a sense of deja vu. The
debt—servicing difficulties experienced in recent years bymany Latin
American and Eastern European nations represent only the latest ina
series of similar episodes stretching back over a period ofcenturies.
Not infrequently did the problems encountered bysovereign borrowers
culminate in default, the widespread defaults of the 1930sbeing merely
the most dramatic and generalized instance of a repeatedphenomenon.
Quite often, defaulting debtors were able to re—enter the international
capital market only to default again, occasioning criticism of creditors
for engaging in reckless lending ascribed to myopia or excessive
competition.
The widespread defaults of the 1930s offer the mostsuggestive
precedent for recent difficulties. In the l930s as in the 1980s,
illiquidity was not confined to any one country or region. In neither
instance can the problems experienced by external debtors be attributed
exclusively to domestic economic and political developments rather,
they must be linked to disturbances to theworldeconomy including, in
1each instance, real interest rate shocks, commodity price fluctuations
and exceptionally severe recessions in industrialized regions. The
extent of the parallels has tempted many observers to see in recent
developments the potential for a replay of the collapse of international
capital markets witnessed in the 1930s.
Skeptics object that institutional arrangements governing
international lending have changed so fundamentally that interwar
experience contains few meaningful lessons for the 1980s. Perhaps the
most prominent institutional innovation is the switch from bond to bank
finance, a development which, by changing the provisions of loan
contracts and reducing the number of creditors party to negotiations, is
said to facilitate rescheduling of debt as an alternative to outright
default. The International Monetary Fund now provides illiquid
borrowers an external lender of last resort which at the same time
serves the capital market in a signaling capacity, providing information
on domestic adjustment programs. Analogous to the foundation of an
international lender of last resort, the establishment of domestic
lenders of last resort, the spread of deposit insurance and the
implementation of macroeconomic stabilization policies are said to have
diminished significantly the likelihood of a business cycle downturn on
the scale of the Great Depression, thereby reducing the danger that
borrowing countries will again be so severely affected by vicissitudes
in the industrialized world.
In the absence of a systematic analysis of the interwar record with
which recent developments might be compared, it is difficult to
determine the relevance of this historical experience to recent
difficulties in international capital markets. To provide a basis for
2comparison, this paper sets out to analyze the pattern of borrowing, the
incidence of default and the returns realized by foreign lenders. Its
first part describes the contours of international lending in the 1920s
and 1930s. Drawing on work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and other
investigators of the experience of the 1970s, we use regression analysis
to summarize cross—section variations in the pattern and magnitude of
sovereign indebtedness. The next part of the paper considers the
incidence and correlates of default, estimating variants of modern
models of debt capacity to explore the extent of association between
standard measures of economic structure and performance and subsequent
interruptions to debt service. In the final part of the paper we
provide a long—run perspective on default and on the remedies available
to creditors. The provisions of loan contracts are reviewed with aneye
toward analyzing the scope for renegotiation. We then presentnew
estimates of the rate of return on foreign loans floated in the 1920s,
disaggregating these estimates between loans in default and loans in
good standing as a way of constructing a measure of the costs of default
as incurred by lenders, and comparing realized rates of return on loans
made in different years, to different countries and to different classes
of borrowers.
We are conscious that this paper only skims the surface of atopic
with many additional dimensions deserving exploration. Our defence is
that establishing the quantitative dimensions of internationalborrowing
and lending in the 1920s is a necessary precondition for analyzing other
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the problem certain to be of
interest. In the concluding section to this paper, we therefore
indicate the most promising directions for research.
32. Who_WeretheLenders?
Between thewars,international lending remained the almost
exclusive preserve of the United States and a few countries of Northwest
Europe. Of the long—term foreign investments outstanding in 1938, the
vast majority were assets of the United States, United Kingdom,
Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Belgium. The U.S. and U.K. alone
accounted for nearly 2/3 of the gross value of long—term foreign
investments (inclusive of foreign loans, corporate securities and direct
investments but excluding war debts and reparations).1/ Hence interwar
trends and fluctuations in foreign investment are largely trends and
fluctuations in American and British lending.
No country had as illustrious if controversial a history of foreign
lending as the United Kingdom. The traditional figures suggest that
more than 55 per cent of total British investment in the period 1871—
1913 was directed overseas.2/ World War I occasioned a considerable
liquidation of Britain's external assets, and in the second half of the
192Os the share of new capital issues for overseas borrowers declined
from its prewar range in excess of 50 per cent to 37—44 per cent before
slumping to very much lower levels in the 193Os. Nonetheless, in 1938
Britain's gross—external—asset—to—gross—national—product ratio remained
an impressive 79%.3/ Of these investments, half were placed in Empire
countries and 15 per cent in each of North and South America, with the
remainder split evenly between Europe and Asia—Oceania. 58% of total
overseas new issues floated between 1920 and 1934 was comprised of
public borrowing and 7% of railway bonds, with the remainder allocated
























































































































































































































































































































































 was disproportionately concentrated in government bonds, foreign lending
in other assets.4/
Tight credit conditions in London and official restrictions on the
export of capital combined to encourage foreign borrowers who had
traditionally floated new issues in Britain to turn increasingly to the
United States. Except for British Dominions and colonies upon whose
borrowing the Colonial Stock Act of 1900 conferred preferential
treatment or who continued to borrow in London for political as much as
economic reasons, for much of the 1920s London and New York were in very
real competition in the flotation of overseas loans.5/ For the United
States, large—scale foreign lending was a recent development. The long—
term—foreign—asset/national—income ratio of the United States was still
less than 9 per cent on the eve of World War 1.6/ In contrast to
Britain, America's foreign assets doubled over the course of the war
and,after fluctuating in the immediate postwar years, soared in the
mid—'twenties. Compared to their British counterparts, American
investorsexhibited a stronger preference for direct over portfolio
investments. Still, some 40% of American long—term foreign assets took
the form of portfolio investment, of which 2/3 were government
securities.7/ In contrast to Britain, where considerations of empire
dominated, the geographical distribution of American investment seems to
have been influenced if not governed by considerations of proximity.
Nearly 40% of total American foreign investment was in Canada, 30% in
Latin America and the West Indies and 20% in Europe, with the residual
scattered across Africa, Asia and Oceania.8/
Figure 1 depicts the pattern of American foreign lending in the
interwar years. [Figure 1 here] In the 1920s it is dominated by the
5steady increase in new lending, which was maintained in each year
between 1920 and 1927 with the exception of 1923, when Prance's
occupation of the Ruhr and attendant political uncertainties increased
the perceived riskiness of foreign investment. Conclusion of the
Locarno Pact and successful placement of the Dawes Loan in 1924
signalled full recovery of the international capital market, which
continued to expand until 1928 when its growth was stifled by the
portfolio shift toward domestic assets associated with the Wall Street
boom. By 1929 new foreign lending had fallen back to 1924 levels,
before recovering slightly in 1930 following the collapse of the stock
market. In 1931, with the further deterioration of economic conditions
and the first defaults abroad, lending slumped to near—negligible
levels, with Canada the only remaining major foreign borrower. By 1932
even Canadian loans had dried up, and lending remained depressed for the
duration of the 1930s.
While long—term capital continued to flow out of the U.S. on
balance until the second half of 1931, as early as the beginning of 1929
the U.S. was draining liquidity from borrowing regions; in other words,
from 1929 new lending fell short of the sum of interest and amortization
receipts.9/ To the extent that timing conveys information about the
direction of influence, the curtailment of lending cannot be seen simply
as passive response to unanticipated default.
Figure 2 indicates that U.K. foreign investment generally moved in
step with American capital exports, but it also shows that U.K. lending
exhibited certain distinctive characteristics. [Figure 2 here] Unlike
American lending, which rose steadily throughout the 'twenties, British

















































































































































































































































































































 declining through 1925 before recovering through 1927. As in theU.S.,
overseas lending peaked in 1928 and fell thereafter, though notas
precipitously or to such low levels. While it is tempting to ascribe
the mid—decade slump in lending to tight credit conditionsassociated
with Britain's return to gold, government policy towardnew capital
issues for overseas borrowers probably played the dominant role.The
fluctuations in Britain's gross capital outflow depicted inFigure 2
closely mirror the changing intensity with which informal controlson
capital export were enforced.1O/
Together,the two figures suggest that the U.K. contributed less
than the U.S. bothto the rise in the gross indebtedness of borrowing
regionsand to the pronounced cyclical movements in theirliquidity
position. In fact, the U.K. contributed nothing at all to the former
during the interwar years. While the gap between the total capital
inflow and outflow of the U.S. swings from large positive numbersin the
late 1920s to large negative numbers in the 1930s, British interestand
amortization receipts exceed the value of the new lending throughout the
interwar years, albeit by a smaller margin in the 1920s than in the
1930s.
3. WhoWerethe Borrowers?
In contrast to foreign lending, which remained thepreserve of a
small number of industrialized economies, a widerange of countries
engaged in foreign borrowing between the wars.According to Lewis's
(1945)estimates of total long—term foreign indebtedness, the regions
with the largest gross international obligations in 1938 were North
7America and Asia. North American debts were almost entirely offset by
foreign assets, since the U.S. was by this time a net creditor, but
Canada's foreign assets of US$2 billion were dwarfed by foreign
liabilities three times that size. Whether one considers gross or net
foreign liabilities, Canada rather than the countries facing highly—
publicized debt—servicing difficulties was the world's most heavily
indebted nation by the end of the interwar years.11/
The leading debtors of the Asia—Oceania group, Australia and India,
werelike Canada members of the British Empires The foreign obligations
of both countries, owed predominantly to the United Kingdom, largely
tookthe form of sovereign and government—guaranteed debt. However, the
foreign obligations of these two debtors were only marginally in excess
of those of China and the Netherlands East Indies. Chinese debts were
inflated by Japanese claims against the portion of China it occupied in
1938 and otherwise concentrated in the form of British direct investment
in Shanghai. The debts of the Netherlands East Indies were half in the
form of Dutch—owned and controlled tin mines and smelters, oil wells and
refineries and plantations, and half government bonds and industrial
debentures.
After North America and Asia—Oceania, Continental Europe was the
most heavily indebted region. Even excluding war debts and reparations,
more than a quarter of Europe's gross foreign obligations was comprised
of Germany's external liabilities. After having attained creditor
status in the decades preceding World War I, some 90% of German foreign
assets had been liquidated during the war or as part of the postwar
settlement Germany then received extensive capital inflows between the
time of the Dawes Loan in 1924 and the imposition of exchange control in
81931. The countries of Eastern Europe were also external debtors; the
bulk of their external obligations took the form of sovereign debt,
although western investment in extractive industries such as Romanian
oil, Polish zinc and Yugoslav copper and bauxite achieved significant
levels.
Given the attention devoted to Latin American debt, it is
Interesting to note that the value of Latin America's gross external
obligations was smaller than the obligations of these other continents.
Concern may have been heightened by the fact that Latin American debt
was heavily concentrated in certain countries. Thus, Argentina ranked
behind only Canada and Australia in terms of the value of gross external
debt. However, only 1/6 of this total was public debt; the rest took
the form of direct foreign investment, of which British investment in
Argentine railways and private enterprise comprised the majority.
Brazil, the second largest Latin American debtor, contrasts sharply with
Argentina. Nearly 2/3 of Brazil's gross external debt represented the
obligations of federal, state and local governments. The finance of
railway construction is indicative of the two national strategies: where
Argentine railways were largely British owned and controlled, Brazilian
railways were owned by the state but financed by foreign borrowing.
4. Cross—SectIon Analysis of International_Borrowing
To summarize the pattern of international indebtedness between the
wars in a fashion which facilitates comparisons with studies of recent
decades, we estimate variants of the borrowing models advanced by such
recent investigators as Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Edwards (1984) and
9Riedel (1983). While these authors each provide a theoretical rationale
for their favored specification, we do not justify or defend their
estimating equations. The results of estimating their equations are
reported here only as a way of providing a basis for comparison between
the 1930s and 1970s.
With the exception of consumption and investment, reliable
estimates of which are simply unavailable, we have assembled information
on the major variables used in recent empirical analyses.12/ Table 1
reports estimates of the equation proposed by Eaton and Gersovitz to
explain the stock of debt held by borrowing countries. Total external
central government debt is related to GDP, population, openness, a
measure of export variability and the rate of growth of GDP. Eaton and
Gersovitz use export variability to proxy for income variability and
argue that it should be positively related to desired borrowing. They
use openness to proxy for the magnitude of the penalty incurred with
retaliation against default, which they argue should be positively
related to desired lending. The sign of the coefficient on income
growth is theoretically ambiguous. Eaton and Gersovitz suggest that the
rate of income growth should be positively related to the demand for
borrowing, since some consumption out of future income is desired now,
but that it may be negatively related to the willingness to lend, since
"rapidly growing countries may have less to fear from the future effects
ofa credit embargo..."13/ If borrowers are on their demand—for—debt
schedules, this variable's coefficient should therefore have a positive
sign; but iftheyare credit—rationed, as itisreasonable to assume was
thecase after 1930, the sign should be negative.
Ordinary least squares estimates like those reported in Table 1
10Table 1
Determinants of Stock of Debt, Annual Cross Sections, 1930—8
(dependent variable is LDEBT)
Years n Constant SDX MD LGDP LPOP GRP R2
1930 20 —3.71 —0.43 2.25 1.03 0.22 —0.22 0.89
(2.10)(11.04) (2.14) (0.15) (0.28) (2.12)
1931 21—3.55 0.80 3.10 1.10 0.14 0.00 0.94
(1.59) (2.40) (1.66) (0.11) (0.21) (0.001)
1932 21—1.23 0.80—0.75 1.04 0.03—0.06 0.92
(1.81) (1.92) (3.22) (0.12) (0.24) (0.48)
1933 18 —1.31 0.13—1.20 0.97 0.12 0.38 0.93
(2.01) (1.94) (2.72) (0.12) (0.25) (0.77)
1934 23—2.17 4.41 1.57 1.02 0.11 0.29 0.92
(1.84) (4.74) (1.65) (0.10) (0.21) (0.48)
1935 23—2.25 4.06 1.44 0.94 0.24—2.58 0.93
(1.77)(17.35) (1.76) (0.12) (0.24) (1.26)
1936 22 —0.26 21.50 0.77 0.850.16 —6.15 0.94
(2.07)(15.68) (2.24) (0.11) (0.22) (0.85)
193719—3.24 13.37 3.23 0.740.48 —2.26 0.67
(4.33)(15.30) (3.94) (0.38) (0.45) (1.53)
1938 16 —1.64 28.52 3.78 0.77 0.18 2.14 0.81
(2.27)(21.35) (2.85) (0.20) (0.29) (4.16)
1930—8 184 —3.36 1.85 1.72 1.01 0.24 —0.001 0.84
(0.70) (1.33) (0.71) (0.05) (0.09) (0.001)
1931—8 163 —3.36 1.83 1.78 1.01 0.24 —0.001 0.83
(0.79) (1.38) (0.86) (0.05) (0.10) (0.001)
Notes: Equations estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors
in parentheses. n denotes the number of observations. Variable
definitions include
LDEBT: log of total external central government debt.
SDX: standard deviation of exports (over years T—2, T—1, T))
scaled (x104)
MD: import/GDP ratio.
LGDP: log of GDP
LPOP: log of population.
GRP:growth rate of GDP (over years T—2, T—1, T).
lOashould be interpreted cautiously for a number of reasons, not the least
of which is potential simultaneity bias. The general impression
conveyed by these estimates is that the Eaton—Gersovitz model provides a
less adequate account of international indebtedness in the 1930s than in
the 1970s. While the results are consistent with the notion that the
level of debt is positively associated with export instability and
degree of openness, the coefficients are not statistically well
determined. The only coefficient which differs from zero at standard
confidence levels in every year considered is that on the log of GOP; in
no case can we reject the hypothesis that this coefficient equals unity.
However, there is some tendency for the coefficient of GOP to shrink in
size as the 1930s progress, indicating that relatively high—income
countries had the greatest tendency to repay previously—acquired debts.
By the end of the decade relatively low—GOP countries were left most
heavily indebted. The predominantly negative coefficient on GOP growth
can be taken as indicative of credit rationing.
The results from pooling the time—series and cross—section data are
quite satisfactory and give a somewhat clearer picture, with positive
coefficients on all regressors except the growth rate of GDP, all
significant at the 5 per cent level except that on export instability.
The coefficient on the log of GOP is so close to unity and so well
determined that it seemed sensible to try debt per unit output as the
left—hand variable. The consequence of deflating the stock of debt in
this way is to give predominantly better determined coefficients on the
remaining regressors, with no qualitative changes. The results from
the pooled equation for 1930—38 are characteristic:
11LDG =—3.37+1.86SDX + 1.74 ND + 0.24 LPOP —0.001GRP
(0.69) (1.32) (0.71) (0.07) (0.0007)
=163,R2 =0.10, F =5.02
LDG =log(debt/GDP)
Other variables defined as in Table 1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
All this uses Eaton and Gersovitz's explanatory variables for the
purposes of comparative description of the data. We have not sought at
this stage to use on our data the disequilibrium modelling approach
which they employ. This is not because we think it inappropriate —
quitethe contrary, as our verbal discussion above suggests. We
believe, however, that it requires a tighter theoretical specification
and perhaps better data than we have developed so far. Although froma
quantity—rationing modeller's standpoint we might criticize the "quasi
reduced form" underlying Table 1 (see Portes and Winter, 1980), it still
provides interesting information about the data we do have.
Edwards (1984) has suggested that the stock demand for debt is
better viewed in terms of the government's problem of selecting its
optimal portfolio of assets and liabilities. Hence stocks of
international reserves and foreign debt should be simultaneously
determined, and the latter will depend in general not only on the
variables suggested by Eaton and Gersovitz but also on the value of
reserves. We have estimated a variant of Edwards's reserve demand
function, using gold reserves as our dependent variable, and obtained
12Table 2
Flow of Borrowing, Cross—Sections for Three—year and Four—Year
Averages 1928—1935
(dependent variable is BOR/GDP)
Notes: Equations estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors
in parentheses. n is number of observations. Variable definitions
include:










Dummy variable for Latin American countries
Dummy variable for Australia








































12aresults remarkably similar to his as reported in Appendix Table Al. We
then added reserves to the equation reported in Table 1, hut neither OLS
nor instrumental variables estimates indicated that reserves had any
impact on the level of debt.14/
Another attempt to permit balance—of--payments developments as
reflected in reserves to influence the accumulation of external debt is
provided by Riedel (1983), who analyzes flow supplies and demands for
new borrowing rather than stocks of debt. Riedel relates the flow of
borrowing to the following ratios: reserves to imports, debt service to
exports, the government budget deficit to GDP, investment to national
income, and income per capita. Results of estimating this equation are
reported in Table 2, where we have added dummy variables for Latin
America and British Empire countries (where the latter include only
Australia in our sample) to flag any differences in their experiences
and have dropped the investment ratio due to absence of data. The
overwhelming impression is, as anticipated, one of pronounced shifts in
the relationship of net lending to its determinants between 1928 and
1935. The coefficients on per capita income suggest that high income
countries had the greatest tendency to borrow before 1932 and,
consistent with Table 1, to repay thereafter. Although the regional
dummy variables are unstable across periods, they suggest on balance
that both Australia and the Latin American countries had unusually high
propensities to borrow until the total collapse of international capital
markets after 1931.
Whether countries experiencing the initial effects of the Great
Depression were able to use foreign funds to help finance the shock is
sensitive to whether or not 1931 is included in the sample. The
13positive coefficient on the reserve ratio for the period prior to 1931
suggests that even at this early date countries experiencing balance—of—
payments difficulties found it relatively difficult to borrow abroad.
This coefficient becomes negligible, however, when the period is
extended through 1931. Similarly, when 1931 is included in the sample,
the positive coefficient on the fiscal deficit suggests that countries
which chose to run deficits in response to the impact of the Great
Depression initially had some ability to finance them through foreign
borrowing. This evidence dissipates when 1931 is excluded from the
sample. Whether the sensitivity of the results to inclusion of 1931 is
due to the appearance that year of the first defaults, to the increasing
inadequacy of our reserve measure given pronounced shifts between gold
and foreign exchange, or to some other peculiar feature of 1931 remains
to be determined.
5. Factors in Default
Part of the explanation for the incidence of default lies in
special national circumstances, including particular primary commodity
endowments, domestic economic policies and the uses to which borrowed
funds were put. Yet in the 1930s as in the 1980s, developing countries
were subjected to common external shocks which affected both the costs
and benefits of interruptions to debt service. The list of common
external disturbances —recessionin the industrialized world, declining
relative prices of primary products, rising real interest rates and
resurgent protectionism —willhave a familiar ring to those who follow
the current situation. It is important therefore that observers struck
14by the resemblance of the 1930s to the 1980s should not lose sight of
the greater severity of the earlier shocks.
A severe business—cycle downturn in the United States could not but
exercise a powerful influence over the liquidity and solvency of
sovereign debtors. The obvious indicator of this influence is size: in
1929 the U.S. accounted for more than half of the industrial output and
nearly 40% of the primary product consumption of the 15 leading
industrial economies.15/Another indicator is the magnitude of the
contraction: one need only note that the Harvard Economic Society index
of the volume of manufacturing fell by 25% between October 1929 and
October 1930 and that real GDP fell at twice the rate typical for the
first year of a recession.16/
One of the principal channels through which these deflationary
pressures were transmitted to developing regions was via primary
commodity prices. In 1929, the most important agricultural goods in
world trade were, in declining order of importance, cotton, wheat,
sugar, coffee, silk and rubber.17/ Countries were variously affected by
their luck in the "commodity lottery,t' to use Diaz—Alejandro's (1983)
term. Between 1929 and 1930 the fall in average annual dollar prices
ranged from nearly 20% for wheat and tin to 30% for cotton, sugar and
silk and 40% for rubber.18/In many cases the fall in export prices
understates the impact on primary commodity exports. Export volumes
declined with export prices as foreign demand curves shifted inwards and
domestic producers moved back down their supply curves. The decline in
foreign demand attributable to the depression was reinforced by
protectionist initiatives which heavily affected foreign food producers.
Ironically, the measures which created special difficulty for foreign
15debtors —tariffand nontariff barriers to imports of foodstuffs —were
adopted by industrial countries to bail out another class of debtors,
namely farmers hit by falling agricultural prices. Together, recession
and protection depressed the export revenues of 41 primary product
exporting countries by some 50% between 1928/29 and 1932/33, an
unprecedented shock by recent standards.
Another way of gauging the shock to indebted regions is in terms of
the change in real interest rates. The fall in U.S. prices that got
underway in the final quarter of 1929 raised ex post short—term real
interest rates to more than 15%.19/ While the real interest rate shocks
of recent years are by no means to be dismissed, they pale in comparison
with the shocks experienced after 1929.
6. Cross—Section Analysis of the Incidence of Default
Existing accounts tend to portray decisions in the 1930s of whether
to default on sovereign debt in one of three ways: (i) as the result of
idiosyncratic national circumstances about which it is difficult to
generalize, (ii) as a function of "bandwagon effects" that proved
irresistible even to basically solvent debtors once the initial defaults
occurred, and (iii) as the only feasible alternative available to
developing countries given the magnitude of the shock to the world
economy. Yet the incidence and extent of sovereign default varied
enormously across countries. None of these approaches provides much
help in understanding that incidence or that extent. This is in
contrast to modern models of debt capacity, in which the incidence of
rescheduling is assumed to be systematically related to a vector of
16national characteristics proxying for its costs and benefits, suchas
the ratio of debt to GNP and various measures of trade performance.20/
Inthis section, we adapt these debt—capacity models to the
circumstances of the 1930s to examine the extent to which country—
specificvariables associated with the costs and benefits of default
help to explain its incidence. If these variables possess explanatory
power, then it will be necessary to supplement if not replace existing
characterizations with an analysis of the incidence of sovereign default
in the 1930s couched in terms of its differential costs and benefits
across countries.
As in modern studies of rescheduling, empirical analysis is
complicated by the fact that the variable of interest —inthis case
sovereign default —cantake on a number of forms of varying severity.
Least serious was to be in default on sinking fund payments only. The
Dominican Republic, for example, while continuing to service faithfully
its dollar debt, temporarily fell into default on sinking fund early in
the 1930s, before making a proposal in 1934 concerning readjustment of
amortization which received the endorsement of the Foreign Bondholders
Protective Council.21/More serious was to be in default on all or a
portion of interest payments. Most serious of all was repudiation, a
rare event in the interwar years.22/ The best availableindicator would
appearto be the share of dollar— and sterling—denominated government
and government—guaranteed debt in default as to interest or sinking
fund.23/
Our measure of default is constructed from data covering national,
state and provincial, municipal and government—guaranteed debt. The
share of dollar— and sterling—denominated debt in default as to interest
17or sinking fund is calculated for the period from 1934, the first year
for which the newly—established Foreign Bondholders Protective Council
published information on arrears, through 1938. The explanatory
variables include proxies for the burden of the debt, the degree of
openness, the severity of the external shock and the stance of domestic
economic policy. Given their significance in Table 2 above, dummy
variables for Latin America and Australia are added to test whether
political or economic factors not otherwise accounted for help to
explain the incidence of default. The external—government—debt—to—
national—income ratio is used as a measure of debt—servicing
requirements —inother words, the burden of the debt. We proxy
openness by the ratio of exports to GDP and the severity of the external
shock by the percentage deterioration in the terms of trade after 1929.
It is likely that simultaneity will affect any attempt to estimate the
impact of the current export share on the incidence of default, since
countries which defaulted may have run policies or experienced sanctions
which subsequently influenced their reliance on trade. Therefore, we
use the lagged export share as a proxy for openness, employing two
alternative formulations: the 1928 export share and the export share six
years prior to the year for which the dependent variable is defined. It
is similarly possible that simultaneity may contaminate the coefficient
on the change in the terms of trade after 1929, since countries which
defaulted may then have run policies or experienced sanctions which
influenced the evolution of relative prices. As an alternative to the
change in the terms of trade between 1929 and the year under
consideration, we employ the change in the terms of trade between 1929
and 1931.
18The next two variables are indicators of the stance of fiscal and
monetary policies. To avoid problems of simultaneity, both variables
are measured as percentage changes between 1929 and 1931, since
countries which defaulted thereafter subsequently had available
different policy options than countries that continued to service their
external debt. The fiscal policy variable is defined as the percentage
change in the central government budget deficit. Data on other levels
of government, while desirable, are not available on a consistent basis.
The monetary policy variable is defined as the percentage change in the
ratio of gold reserves to note circulation. Almost all the countries in
the sample remained on the gold standard into 1931; in the long run,
therefore, their money supplies were endogenously determined. In the
short run, however, governments could attempt to influence money supply
and any domestic economic conditions it affected through domestic credit
creation which would have as its eventual consequence a loss of
international reserves. Therefore, the greater the rise in the ratio of
reserves to money supply, the more restrictive was monetary policy.
While it would be desirable to include other foreign assets in addition
to gold and to use a broader measure of money supply than notes and coin
in circulation, adequate data are not available for the range of
countries included here.
Two—limit probit analysis is used to analyze the incidence and
extent of default in light of the fact that the observed dependent
variable is obtained as zero for countries which did not default) as
unity for countries in default on all their obligations, and as a range
of intermediate values for countries partially in default.24/
Pooled time—series cross—section results are reported in Table
193.25/ Theresults are striking for their conformance with basic
economic intuition. First, the most heavily indebted countries, as
measured by the debt/income ratio, appear to have had the greatest
tendency to default. Second, countries which experienced relatively
severe deteriorations in their terms of trade also had a tendency toward
default. This is true regardless of the terms—of—trade measure used.
Thus) the commodity lottery looms as important not only for explaining
the impact of the Depression on primary—producing countries but also in
explaining their response.
These results seem quite inconsistent with the notion that all
developing countries experiencing the Great Depression had no
alternative but simply to opt for default. Rather, they suggest that
the magnitude of the debt burden and severity of the external shock
influenced the extent to which countries fell into arrears. At the same
time, they are inconsistent with the view that non—economic factors,
such as political ties to the principal creditor countries, provide the
entire explanation for the incidence of default. This is not to say
that the regional dummy variables can be dismissed. That for Australia
has a negative sign which differs significantly from zero at any
reasonable confidence level, indicating that the extent of default was
significantly less than predicted by the economic variables included in
the equation, a result tempting to interpret in terms of Australia's
political and cultural ties to the United Kingdom.In contrast, the
incidence of default among Latin American countries is sufficiently well
predicted by the economic variables in the equation that the coefficient
on the Latin American dummy retains no residual explanatory power.
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Two—Limit Probit Regressions of Covariates of Default: Pooled Time—Series
Cross—Section Results, 1934—1938
(dependent variable is percentage of dollar and sterling
debt in default as to interest and/or amortization)
Variable (j) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Constant 0.519 0.521 0.003 0.026
(0.054) (0.047) (0.190) (0.136)
Debt/income ratio 0.328 0.345 0.659 0.931
(0.164) (0.182) (0.298) (0.258)
Percent deterioration, 0.223 0.567
terms of trade, 1929—31 (0.083) (0.266)
Percent deterioration, 0.271 0.822
terms of trade, 1929— (0.089) (0.260)
current year
Lagged export/GDP ratio 0.062 —0.326
(0.044) (0.480)
1928 export/GDP ratio 0.071 0.159
(0.207) (0.770)
Percent increase in 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
budget deficit, 1929—31 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Percent increase in 0.169 0.185 0.305 0.386
reserve ratio, 1929—31 (0.049) (0.047) (0.195) (0.186)




Log—likelihood —139.67 —143.06 —84.23 —81.23
Notes: Coefficient estimates are accompanied by standard errors in
parentheses. Number of observations =95.Variable definitions
include:
Debt/income ratio: total external central government debt/GDP.
Percent increase in budget deficit: central government deficit only.
Percent increase in reserve ratio ratio of gold reserves to notes
and coin in circulation.
For further details, see the text and data appendix.
2 OaThe coefficient on the change in the budget deficit is positive and
differs significantly from zero at the 90 per cent confidence level or
better when the dummy variables for region are included. In other
words, governments which ran austere budgetary policies in response to
the Great Depression were best able to avoid debt—servicing
difficulties. Those which engaged in what were by the standards of
1929—31 relatively heterodox fiscal policies had the greatest tendency
to default. The obvious interpretation of this result is in terms of
the absorption approach to the balance of payments —that,ceteris
paribus, deficit spending raised domestic absorption of imports and
exportable goods, reducing the foreign—exchange receipts available for
servicing external debt.
The coefficient on the monetary policy variable indicates that
countries experiencing relatively large increases in the ratio of gold
reserves to currency circulation had the greatest tendency to default.
This result is inconsistent with the notion that countries engaging in
expansionary monetary policies were driven to default by any balance of
payments difficulties that resulted. Similar results have been found
when estimating debt capacity models for the 1970s and interpreted to
indicate that sovereign debtors anticipating eventual default hoarded
reserves to finance subsequent import purchases whose expense could no
longer be defrayed by additional foreign borrowing.
An alternative explanation for this result would appear to be the
inadequacy of gold as a proxy for international reserves and of note
circulation as a proxy for money supply. Consider for example the first
of these problems. Countries in our sample held gold and convertible
foreign exchange in various proportions. The use of gold reserves as a
21proxy for the total would not be a problem if those proportions remained
constant. However, Nurkse (1944, p.41) notes that the share of foreign
exchange in the gold and exchange reserves of 18 debtor countries for
which he has information fell from 33 to 15 per cent between 1929 and
1931. Yet certain countries swam against this tide; Australia, for
example, liquidated a major share of its gold reserves and replaced them
with foreign exchange. Hence eliminating the dummy variable for
Australia, as in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3, alters the
coefficient on the monetary variable, which no longer differs uniformly
from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level.26/
The mystery of the monetary variable should not be permitted to
detract from the other conclusions. Overall, the results suggest that
basic economic intuition and simple economic variables go a long way
toward explaining the incidence and extent of sovereign default in the
1930s.
7. The Scope for Renegotiation
To understand the scope for renegotiation, it is necessary to
consider the mechanics of foreign borrowing. Procedures in London and
New York were quite similar. The first step for a sovereign borrower
wishing to obtain funds on the London market was to issue a prospectus.
Typically, the terms of the offer and solvency of the debtor had already
been examined by a reputable issuing house, which endorsed the loan by
attaching its name to the prospectus.27/ In New York, specialized
marketing houses played an analogous role. The revenues accruing to the
managing houses took the form of the spread between the bonds' purchase
22price (the price received by the foreign borrower) and the sales price
(the price paid by the ultimate bondholder).
Flotation might be undertaken by a syndicate of issuing houses and
banks. Since different institutions might have a comparative advantage
either in negotiating an acceptable loan contract with the borrower or
in marketing the bonds, it was not uncommon for one syndicate to resell
a loan to another before making the bonds available to the public.
Short—term advances were often extended to the foreign borrower in
anticipation of successful placement of the loan. To market the
securities, issuing houses based primarily in New York and Chicago
employed itinerant bond salesmen and established branch offices across
the United States and Canada. Some New York banks established special
security affiliates which could directly serve in this capacity without
violating American branch banking laws. If at first observers hailed
the verve with which these travelling salesmen trumpeted the virtues of
foreign bonds, after the first defaults they accused these same
promoters of a variety of excesses.28/ The facility with which these
securities were marketed is evidenced by the extent of sales to persons
of relatively moderate means. Although the available statistics are
incomplete, they suggest that in the 1920s the mean value of lots of
foreign bonds was less than $5000. Since this figure is inflated by a
small number of very large purchases, the typical lot would appear
smaller still had we an estimate of the median. For example, the face
value of the average holding of Chilean bonds in the 1930s appears to
have been no more than $800 when the 4% of largest holdings is
eliminated.29/ The small size of holdings and large number of
bondholders is often credited with creating a severe free—rider problem
23in the event of default and negotiation.
There was little scope for litigation as an avenue for obtaining
satisfaction from defaulting debtors. American and British courts had
no jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, who could be sued in their own
courts only with their consent.30/ One way in which lenders attempted
to protect themselves was by writing into loan contracts provisions
which earmarked certain revenues for debt service. Unfortunately,
nothing prevented a foreign government from also breaching these
provisions if it fell into default on interest or amortization.
Bondholders therefore tried to enlist the aid of their governments.
Government involvement could range from informal negotiations through
diplomatic representations and economic sanctions to armed force. The
U.S. State Department maintained a policy of official noninterposition
in negotiations between American bondholders and foreign governments,
although diplomats and officials did not hesitate to express their
interest in a settlement. The British, in contrast, permitted the
bondholders to delegate a British minister to the foreign country, or
his consul—general, as their local agent, a practice certain to raise
questionsin the debtor's mind about the capacity in which the minister
was negotiating.31/ The use of armed force, however nostalgically
viewedby bondholders, was basically a thing of the past. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission advised bondholders to eliminate from
their consideration the use of force as a means of debt collection.32/
This left economic sanctions. The threat of sanctions in response
to Germany's 1933—34 default illustrates the use of this instrument. In
the summer of 1933 the German government declared a moratorium on the
overseas transfer of interest payments.33/ Negotiations between the
24head of the Reichsbank and foreign creditors ensued, yielding a
compromise under which Germany agreed to meet a portion of its
obligations. The Dutch and Swiss rejected the pact, however, and
threatened to impose sanctions. The credibility of their threat was
enhanced by the fact that both countries ran trade deficits against
Germany, implying that the costs of German retaliation were likely to
exceed the benefits. The Germans settled separately with both
countries, with Dutch and Swiss nationals ultimately receiving full
interest on their Dawes and Young plan bonds and cash payments of 3 1/2
to 4 1/2 per cent on most other German bonds.
Similar threats were then issued by and agreements reached with
Sweden, France and Belgium. The mere opening of debate over sanctions
in the British Parliament was sufficient to prod Germany into action.
Before the measure could be passed into law, a German delegation arrived
in London, and within a month an agreement was reached providing for
full interest payments to British nationals on Dawes and Young plan
bonds.34/ In contrast, the nationals of countries whose governments
maintained their policy of official noninterposition received less
favorable treatment. The U.S. State Department protested such
discrimination against American bondholders, but to little effect.35/
Bond finance and the associated free—rider problem are blamed for
the difficulty of negotiating settlements when debt—servicing
difficulties arose. Under bank finance, illiquid debtors can turn to
their creditors, who are relatively few in number, for bridging loans,
while insolvent debtors can negotiate a mutually—acceptable sharing of
losses. Under bond finance, creditors were allegedly too many and bond
covenants too inflexible for illiquidity to result in anything but
25default or for insolvent debtors and their creditors to achieve a
mutually—acceptable sharing of losses. In fact, there existed a number
of mechanisms for internalizing the externalities that gave rise to free
riding.The major difference between the interwar and postwar periods
lies not in the prevalence of negotiations designed to achieve an
equitablesharing of losses, since negotiations were commonplace in both
eras. Rather, the difference is the extent to which some form of
default was a necessary prerequisite for getting negotiations
started .36/
The fact that bond issues were floated by issuing houses and banks
meant that there existed agents sufficiently few in number and large in
size to have in principle provided bridging loans. Such short—term
loans and advances had been common in the 1920s (see de Cecco, 1984).
Moreover, it was in the banks' interest to tide over illiquid debtors,
since they suffered embarrassment from default on bonds with whose issue
they had been associated. It is troubling, therefore, that little such
lending occurred after 1929. It could be that the debt crisis was
quickly recognized as a problem of insolvency rather than illiquidity,
and that money center banks rationally refused to throw goodmoney after
bad. This hypothesis imputes considerable foresight to the lending
institutions. Moreover, it overlooks the possibility that their very
unwillingness to provide short—term credit may have been directly
responsible for transforming what remained a problem of illiquidity into
one of insolvency. The banks' unwillingness to provide short—term loans
preceded by a year the onset of default. For example, in 1930 Bolivian
officials confronted with debt—servicing difficulties visited New York
to "treat with" American banks. Negotiations to obtain short—term loans
26were unavailing, and in 1931 Bolivia became the first Latin American
debtor to default, setting off a chain reaction.37/ The alternative
hypothesis is that, with only the goodwill of their customers rather
than their own assets at stake, financial institutions had little
incentive to bear the risk that what might appear to be illiquidity was
really insolvency. If so, then a major difference between bank and bond
finance is that under the latter, default was a necessary precondition
to the successful restructuring of a loan. It does not follow, however,
that under bond finance there was little scope for serious negotiation.
If default ensued, a readjustment program might be negotiated by
the issuing house or by a committee it organized. Issuing houses
characterized themselves as "moral trustees" obliged to protect the
bondholders' interests.38/ Bondholders recognized, however, that the
issuing house was likely to be torn between the interests of two sets of
customers: bondholders and foreign borrowers. Moreover, the indebted
government was the issuing house's single largest customer, with whom
the lender was likely to have established a valued long—term
relationship. Given the potential for conflict of interest, most
readjustments were therefore negotiated not by issuing houses but by
independent committees. The legal status of these committees varied:
some obtained the physical deposit of bonds which they were authorized
to use at their discretion; others took a proxy or power of attorney
from bondholders who retained possession of their certificates; and
still others received no legal authorization from bondholders, who they
could claim to represent only informally.
The British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (known less formally
as the British Council and less favorably as the "conscience of the
27loanmongers") was the oldest such organization, having been founded in
1868.39/ With six of its 21 members appointed by the British Bankers'
Association, six by the London Chamber of Commerce and nine by the
Council as a whole, it could claim to represent the interests of both
the City of London and the bondholding community. Until the end of 1933
there existed no comparable organization in the United States.40/
American practice was to form ad hoc committees in response to
individual defaults. The shortcomings of the method were notorious.
Administrative expenses were inflated by the inability to exploit the
scale economies offered by simultaneous negotiations with various
debtors. Ad hoc committees could not bring the same pressure to bear as
so august an institution as the British Council. Moreover, rivalry
among competing committees undermined the credibility of each. Multiple
committees might be formed for various reasons, including competition
for profits, since the organizers typically received a commission paid
Out of debt service charges upon the conclusion of a settlement. More
often, rival committees were formed when issuing houses established one
and disenchanted bondholders another. The two then competed for
support, employing newspaper publicity and agents who were paid on a
commission basis to secure the deposit or registration of bonds. Not
only did this encourage committees and their agents to make extravagant
promises, but a debtor government was faced with the problem of
determining which committee best represented its creditors. In 1933 the
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council was finally established in the
U.S. on a nonprofit basis. It proved a popular vehicle for subsequent
readjustment negotiations, although its critics continued to suggest
that it was unduly influenced by the banks.
28Readjustment plans were signalled by the publication of a decree or
simply an annoucement that bond covenants were henceforth modified. If
the plan was a result of successful negotiations, its acceptance would
be recommended by the bondholders' committee involved. A new coupon was
specified and the principal might be adjusted. A new date by which the
loan would be called was specified. Bondholders indicated their
acceptance of the arrangement by cashing a coupon and, when requested,
by exchanging an old certificate for a new one. If acceptance of the
offer was recommended by a prominent agency such as the Foreign
Bondholders Protective Council, few options remained for dissident
bondholders. In theory, they could withhold their coupons and form
another committee to negotiate a better settlement. In practice,
foreign governments had little further interest in negotiations once
their good standing had been restored by the seal of approval of the
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council. Only the possibility of
widespread dissatisfaction with the terms negotiated by the councils
provided a check on the process.
How the bondholders fared under these arrangements is an empirical
question, to which we now turn.
8. The Impact of Default and Bondholders'Ability toRecover
Little is known about the realized rate of return on foreign bonds
purchased during the 1920s. Madden et al. (1937) estimated the current
rate of return on foreign dollar bonds (excluding Canadian issues) on an
accrual basis; as shown in Table 4, they took interest as it accrued
plus or minus gain or loss on redemption as a percentage of the amount
29Table 4
Previous Estimates of the Rate of Return on Overseas Loans
(rate of return is measured in percentage points)





















Notes: Rate of return on foreign dollar bonds (exclusive of Canadian
issues) is from Madden et al. (1937), p.154. This is interest paid in
cash as a percentage of the amount invested adjusted for principal
repaid in cash. Rate of return on Latin American securities quoted on
the London Stock Exchange at the end of eachyear is from the South
American Journal (January 20, 1940), p. 44. This is dividends,
interest, arrears of interest and bonus as a percentage of the book
value of investment.
2 9aof bonds valued at the original purchase price.41/ The figures reveal
that over the decade of the 1920s the current rate of return on dollar
bonds fluctuated in the range of 7—8 per cent. The highest rates of
return occurred at the beginning of the decade; then between 1923 and
1929 the rate of return exhibited no obvious trend. With the onset of
the Depression, that rate declined to 6.90 per cent in 1930, and in 1931
the first defaults combined with the repurchase of bonds for
cancellation at prices below par reduced the yield further. Additional
defaults continued to depress the yield until 1934, when the redemption
of Netherlands East Indies, Swiss and French issues on a gold basis, in
conjunction with the depreciation of the dollar, temporarily raised the
return .42/
The rate of return on a class of sterling assets, sterling bonds in
Latin America, was calculated on a similar basis in 1940 by the South
American Journal. These estimates appear in the second column of Table
4.One is struck first of all by the fact that throughout the 1920s the
required rate of return on sterling bonds in Latin America was below the
rate of return on foreign dollar bonds, perhaps reflecting the greater
perceived riskiness of American loans. With the onset of default, the
rate of return falls by roughly 50 per cent, not unlike the percentage
decline in the current return on dollar bonds. Yet it is not known
whether the returns on Latin American bonds are representative of
British investments abroad.
The inevitable limitation of estimates constructed in 1937 or 1940
is that they have no way of incorporating the impact on the rate of
return of subsequent interruptions to debt service, notably those
associated with World War II, or of subsequent settlements between
30creditors and defaulting debtors. Many Italian dollar bonds, for
example, went into default in the autumn of 1940, and no additional
interest was paid until 1947. Most German bonds which fell into default
in 1933 or 1934 were only validated in 1955 as part of the London
Agreement, after which service was resumed. Several early Latin
American defaults, such as Bolivia's in 1931, were not settled until
after World War II.
We have therefore constructed new estimates of the realized rate of
return on bonds issued on behalf of overseas borrowers in the United
States and United Kingdom during the 1920s. Tracking these bonds,
sometimes for more than half a century, proves to be a daunting task.
Rather than attempting to follow all overseas issues, we took random
samples of 50 dollar bonds for foreign borrowers issued in the United
States in the period 1924—1930 and 31 colonial and foreign government
loans offered for subscription in London in the period 1923—1930.
Dominick and Dominick, in their annual reviews, provide a listing
and brief report on all foreign dollar issues.43/ Out of approximately
300 bonds, we selected every sixth one listed by this publication to
form our sample of 50. The source for information on sterling bonds was
the publications of the London Stock Exchange.44/ Our procedure for
selecting sterling bonds was the same as with dollar bonds except for
the sampling factor and the treatment of Australian loans. Since
Australian issues were so heavily represented in sterling loans offered
on behalf of overseas governments, to insure adequate geographical
coverage we included one in five rather than one in six of the colonial
and foreign government issues listed by the Stock Exchange and
stratified the sample by including only half the Australian loans which
31would have otherwise been selected.45/
We then collected information on interest and principal paid, as
reported on dollar bonds by Dominick and Dominick through 1937 and by
the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council thereafter. Comparable
information on sterling loans was extracted from the Stock Exchange
Yearbooks and the Stock Exchange Daily Official List. Since amounts
paid fluctuated by year, as our measure of the yield we calculated the
internal rate of return.
Assumptions had to be adopted in order to estimate these rates of
return. For example, in many cases no information was provided on the
share of bondholders who accepted a plan offered by a foreign government
in settlement of its default. Lacking evidence to the contrary, we
assumed that bondholders accepted the plan. When two options were
offered in settlement of default, it was straightforward to construct
the overall rate of return by weighting the rates under the alternative
plans by the shares of bondholders which accepted each. When no such
informationwas provided, we were forced to assume that half the
bondholders accepted each alternative. Only interest paid in cash is
included. Interest paid in scrip or blocked balances is not counted as
a component of the rate of return until the year it actually accrued to
the lender in sterling or dollars.
Our estimates of the internal rate of return on the two samples of
bonds, weighted by the value of the initial issues, are 0.72 per cent
for the entire sample of dollar bonds and 5.41 per cent for sterling
loans. If we restrict the sample of dollar bonds to those issued by
governments or with government guarantees (all the sterling loans in our
sample are in this category), the IRR is 3.25 per cent, much closer to
32the comparable sterling loan figure.
The first observation to be made is that these numbers are
positive, a fact not previously known. A second observation is that
investors in sterling and dollar bonds appear to have fared differently
in the long term. While the internal rate of return on sterling issues
is quite close to the statutory rate under the bond covenants, the
return on the full sample of dollar issues is small relative to the
statutory rate. The latter is only ten per cent of the average rate of
return on foreign dollar bonds for the period 1924—1930 as it appears in
Table4.Moreover, the 1924—30 returns in Table 4 underestimate the
yieldto maturity sincethey deflate interest payments by the initial
salesprice of thebond.46/ Similarly, our internal rate of return
calculationsmay overstatethe return received by typical American
investors,some of whom may have resold their bonds to the defaulting
governmentat deep discounts in transactions of which we have no record.
On the other hand, converting the time series of returns on each
sterling loan into dollars at the applicable exchange rates and
recalculating the IRR gives somewhat lower IRRs, reflecting the secular
depreciation of sterling. The average IRR falls by 0.6 per cent and
therefore comes closer to the figure for dollar bonds. The pattern does
not change much, however, nor would any of the results reported here.
By themselves, the adequacy of these yields is difficult to gauge.
Comparisons with the yields on other bonds may be helpful; these are
provided in Table 5. Note that no correction for default has been made
to the municipal, railroad and corporate bond yields in the table; doing
so would require another extensive calculation. However, the yield on
high grade municipals was not dissimilar from the yield on U.S. Treasury
33Table 5
Rates of Return on Alternative Dollar and Sterling Bonds
(in percentage points)
Dollar Bonds Sterling Bonds
Bond Yield Bond Yield
High Grade Municipals 4.11 Treasury Bills 3.84
10 Railroad Bonds 4.45 Short Dated Gilts 4.46
Aaa Corporate Bonds 4.71 Consol Rate 4.48
Aa Corporate Bonds 4.97 31 Government and 5.41
Government—guaranteed
A Corporate Bonds 5.31 Overseas Bonds
BaaCorporate Bonds 5.97
33 Government and 3.25
Government—guaranteed
ForeignBonds
50 Foreign Bonds 0.72
(includingcorporate
issues)
Notes: All figures except for foreign and overseas bonds are average
yields to maturity over the periods 1924—30 for dollar bonds and 1923—30
for sterling bonds. For foreign and overseas bonds, the internal rate
of return is reported.
Source: For foreign and overseas bonds, see text. Railroad bond yields
are from Tinbergen (1930), pp. 211—212. Other dollar—bond yields are from
Federal Reserve Board (1935), p. 185. British consol rate is from
Mitchell and Deane (1926). Other sterling—bond yields are from London and
Cambridge Economic Service (1970).
33abonds, a default—free asset. In comparison, the realized rate of return
on foreign dollar bonds is disappointing. Note that the same cannot be
said of sterling loans: their internal rate of return exceeds the
average yield on consols over the period.
One way to gauge the impact of default on the realized yield is to
regress the internal rate of return (IRR) on a constant and a dummy
variable for default. Since all the sterling bonds in our sample are
government—issued or government—guaranteed, for comparability here we
use only the subsample of dollar bonds which are government or
government—guaranteed (although in fact a regression for the full sample
of 50 dollar bonds gives results almost identical to those for the
subsample of 33). Weighted least squares (WLS) is used where the
weights are the value of the bond issue relative to the mean value of
issues in the sample. This yields:
IRR(dollarbonds) =6.74—11.02DEFAULT n =33
(2.08) (2.87) S.E.= 12.17
IRR (sterling =5.82—1.68DEFAULT n =31
bonds) (0.06) (0.48) S.E. 0.98
with standard errors in parentheses. The constant terms can be
interpreted as the internal rate of return for issues on which there was
no default. It is clear that differences in the return to bonds on
which there was no default do not account for the very different
experiences of British and American investors; rather, the greater cost
34of default on American issues more than accounts for the difference.
That differential in constant terms which exists is, however, consistent
with the information on the rate at which interest accrued in the 1920s
as summarized in Table 4.
In each case, the internal rate of return on foreign bonds that
fell into default was significantly less than the rate of return on
bonds which continued to be serviced despite the best efforts of the
bondholders' protective committees and the American and British
governments. However, according to the point estimates of the dummy
variables for all issues experiencing some form of default, an
interruption to debt service on dollar bonds reduced the internal rate
of return by, on average, 11 per cent. On sterling bonds the cost of an
interruption to debt service averaged in contrast less than 2 per cent.
That the return on continuously serviced sterling loans was lower than
that on comparable dollar loans while the cost of the average default on
dollar loans was higher reinforces the hypothesis that this differential
default risk was recognized in the 1920s and incorporated into the
required rate of return on the two categories of assets.
As an accounting exercise, the weighted rates of return can be
regressed on vectors of dummy variables for year of issue, location, or
type of borrower. In this way the returns realized by investors in
different types of bonds can be compared. Table 6 reports WLS
regressions of the internal rate of return against a constant term and a
vector of dummy variables for year. The first year in the sample —1923
for sterling loans and 1924 for dollar loans —isthe omitted
alternative, and its average rate of return is the constant term. It has
been argued that the quality of loans deteriorated as the decade
35progressed and that this should have been reflected in the realized rate
of return. There is weak evidence to this effect in the case of dollar
bonds. Realized rates of return are lower for loans issued in most
years after 1924, but only the return on 1927 issues is significantly
less than the return on 1924 issues at standard confidence levels. The
variation in the internal rate of return on sterling bonds by year of
issue is quite different. For reasons that are not obvious3 that rate
is significantly lower for loans issued in the period 1924—1926 than
either before or after.
Table 7 shows regressions of the internal rate of return on a
vector of geographical dummy variables. The omitted alternative is
Germany, so the rate of return on German bonds is picked up by the
constant term. The positive coefficients suggest that investors in non—
German bonds did relatively well; the returns on Central American, South
American, Western European, Eastern European and Japanese bonds are all
significantly greater than the returns on German bonds at the 90 per
cent confidence level or better. It is not suprising that the rate of
return on German bonds proved particularly low, since most of them fell
intodefaultin 1933—34afterwhich no interest was paid for two or even
threedecades. Nor is it surprising that the return on West European
bonds was significantly higher, since most of those in the sample were
continuouslyserviced, the Italian bonds providing a notable exception.
However, the difference between Germany on the one hand and Japan, Latin
America and Eastern Europe on the other is intriguing since default
occurred on all the Japanese and East European dollar bonds and most of
the South American dollar bonds in the sample. However, while the
German bonds remained in default for two or three decades, the Japanese
36Table 6
Realized Rates of Return on Overseas Loans by Year of Issue



















SE of regression 13.151 0.923
R2 .34 .99
number of obs. 50 31
Note: Equations are estimated using weighted least squares. Standard
errors in parentheses. In column (1), the omitted alternative is 1924;
in column (ii) it is 1923. Note that the entire sample of 50 foreign
dollar bonds is used in these estimates.
Source: see text.
36aTable 7
Realized Rates of Return on Overseas Loans by Country
or Continental Group
(dependent variable is rate of return in percentage points)
Dollar Loans Sterli Loans
Variable (i) (ii)










Western Europe 21.171 —0.053
(2.01) (2.54)
Eastern Europe 13 .491 1.483
(5.50) (2.88)
SE of regression 7.644 0.928
R2 .76 .99
number of obs. 50 31
Note: Equations are estimated using weighted least squares.
Standard errors in parentheses. The constant term is a point
estimate of the return on bonds floated for the omitted borrower,
Germany. The point estimate of the return on bonds issued on
behalf of borrowers in other regions is the sum of the constant and
the relevant slope coefficient. The entire sample of 50 dollar
bonds is used for these estimates.
Source: see text.
36bTable 8
Realized Rates of Return on Dollar Loans by Category of Borrower












Nationally Affiliated Bank —23.54 —23.54
(2.33) (2.31)




S.E. of regression 8.208 8.110
R2 .72 .72
Note: Equations estimated by weighted least squares. Standard
errors in parentheses. The constant term is the point estimate of
the return on loans to the omitted borrowers, national governments.
The point estimate oE the return on loans to other types of borrowers
is the sum of the constant and the relevant slope coefficient. The
entire sample of 50 dollar bonds is used in these estimates.
Source: See text.
36cTable 9
Realized Rates of Return on Sterling Loans by Category of Borrower




British Funds 0.650 0.650
(2.45) (2.40)
Dominion, Provincial or Colonial 1.559 1.559
Government Securities (0.524) (0.51)
Dominion, Provincial or Colonial 0.979
Corporation Stocks (12.79)
Foreign Corporation Stocks —0.470
(2.19)
All Corporation Stocks —0.431
(2.13)
S.E. of regression 1.045 1.026
.99 .99
Note: Equations estimated by weighted least squares. Standard
errors in parentheses. The constant term is the point estimate of
the return on loans to the omitted borrower, national governments.
The point estimate of the return on loans to other types of borrowers
is the sum of the constant and the relevant slope coefficients.
Source: See text.
36dbonds in the sample fell into default only in 1942 and service was
resumed as early as 1952. Partial interest continued to be paid on many
of the South American bonds, and readjustments, involving conversions to
new principal and interest amounts, were offered on the South American
bonds in our sample between 1936 and 1948.
In contrast, there is little statistically significant variation by
borrowing country or continent in the rate of return on sterling bonds.
It appears that British investors, perhaps due to their government's
anticipated threat of trade sanctions, were able to secure a positive
rate of return on their German investments which did not fall
significantly short of the return on other overseas loans.
In a similar accounting exercise, Tables 8 and 9 show regressions
of the weighted internal rate of return on a vector of dummy variables
for type of borrower, where national government is the omitted
alternative. Despite the preoccupation of many commentators with
sovereign default, it appears that investors who lent to national
governments ultimately received respectable rates of return. According
to Table 8, concerned with dollar bonds, only returns on loans to
corporations and to banks affiliated with national governments (which
include in this sample the Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Denmark, the
German Central Bank for Agriculture, the National Bank of Panama, the
Mortgage Bank of Chile, and the Mortgage and Agricultural Mortgage Banks
of Colombia) fell significantly short of the returns on loans to
national governments at the 95 per cent confidence level. Table 9 shows
for sterling bonds that the rate of return on loans to national
governments was virtually indistinguishable from the return on to
corporations and on British Funds. (British Funds was the name given to
37loans insured or guaranteed by the British government itself.)
Contemporary preoccupation with defaults by national governments may
have been justified insofar as sovereign default encouraged or provided
a rationale for defaults by the country's other foreign borrowers. But
the settlements provided by national governments which defaulted on
their sterling obligations, such as Italy, Chile, and Colombia, appear
to have been relatively favorable to the creditors, yielding internal
rates of return in the range of 3 to 5 per cent.
9. Directions for Research
In this paper we have focussed exclusively on three aspects of
interwar experience with external debt and default: the pattern of
borrowing, the incidence of default, and the returns realized by the
lenders. Despite conscious efforts to circumscribe the range of issues
considered, important aspects of each question have been left untouched.
Thus, we have not considered the role of the League of Nations in the
League Loans of the 1920s and their relationship to the expansion of the
international capital market. Nor have we considered the similarities
and differences between the Kemmerer Missions to Latin America and IMF
conditionality. A further omission especially relevant to our analysis
of default is the treatment of war debts and reparations generally and
the 1931 Hoover Moratorium in particular.
Another intriguing issue which we have not yet begun to address is
the relationship of default to the subsequent economic performance of
the borrowing countries. Whether default dLsrupted trade and capital
38flows in ways with serious implications for the subsequent growth of the
capital—importing economies is a question with obvious implications for
our assessment of the management of recent debt—servicing difficulties.
39Table Al
Demand For International Reserves, Annual Cross Sections, 1930—38
(dependent variable is LGOLD)
Year n Constant LGDP LMD LCVX
1930 22 —4.53 1.17 0.16 0.14 0.91
(0.91) (0.10) (0.29) (0.18)
1931 21 —1.32 0.23 0.36 0.51 0.52
(2.20) (0.18) (0.71) (0.13)
1932 21 —3.53 1.13 0.39 —0.06 0.85
(1.32) (0.10) (0.44) (0.07)
1933 18 —3.90 1.17 0.42 —0.06 0.84
(1.34) (0.14) (0.76) (0.08)
1934 23 —3.13 1.17 0.86 —0.09 0.73
(1.35) (0.16) (0.34) (0.09)
1935 23 —3.04 1.14 0.79 —0.02 0.69
(1.56) (0.16) (0.46) (0.10)
1936 22 —2.22 1.11 1.16 0.06 0.60
(1.73) (0.19) (0.62) (0.12)
1937 19 —3.11 1.23 1.58 0.16 0.59
(3.27) (0.29) (0.68) (0.15)
1938 16 —2.35 1.20 1.65 0.15 0.51
(3.92) (0.36) (0.81) (0.19)
1930—8 185 —2.87 1.16 0.76 0.26 0.75
(0.52) (0.05) (0.13) (0.12)
Notes: Equations estimated by ordinary least squares. Standard errors
in parentheses. Variable definitions include:
LGOLD: log of gold reserves.
LGDP: log of GDP
LMD:log of the import/GDP ratio.
LCVX: log of the coefficient of variation of exports for the three
years T—2, T—1, T.Tab), R?
l;tofFo!in Dollar Ponds u;ed InRateof Return Calculation
1.AlpIneMontanSteel Corporation (ustr1a, 1926, *5., 5.921)
2. Kingdom of Belgium Stabilization Loan (Belgium,1926,150., 7.892)
3. Kingdo. of Denmark (Denmark, 1925, *30., 5.492)
4. MortgageBankof the Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, 1927, 14.3., 5.332)
5. Finnish Guaranteed Municipal Loan of 1924 (Finland, 3924, *7., $.662
6. International Power Securities Corp., Delaward Corp., Collateral Truit
8 (France, 1924, 14., 7.572)
7.FreeStat.of Dldenburg (Germany, 1925, *3., 4.992)
B. City of Berlin (Germany, 1928, *15., 3.01)
9.City of Hanover ConvertIb1 Bond (Ger.any, 1929, 13.5.,4.492)
10German Central Bank for Agriculture (Germany, 1927, 150.,—19.411)
11. General Consolidated Municipal Loan of 6,r.an Savings Banks and
Clearing Associations (Germany, 1928, 117.5., 3.671)
12. Saxon State Mortage institution (Germany, 1925, 15., —8.582)
13. Brandenburg Electric Company (Germany, 1928, 15., 2.492)
14.GelsenkirchenMining Corp. (Germany, 1928, 115., 6.531)
15. Hamburg Electric Company (Germany, 1925, 14., —8.951)
16. Leipzig Overland Power Companies (Germany, 1926, 13.,—3.5ZZ)
17.Dberpfalz Electric Power Corp. (Germany, 1926, 11.25., —11.971)
18. RhineWestFalia Electric Power Corp. (Germany, 1925, *10., —8.682)
19. SeimensandHalike A.G.SiemensSchuck.rtwerker 6...b.H. (Germany,
1926, 124., —14.202)
20. United Industrial Corp. Hydro—Electric First Mortgage (Germany, 1925,
16., —9.492)
21. Westphalim United Electric Power Corp. (Germany, 1928, 120m, -24.122)
22. Hungarian Consolidated Municipal Loan (Secured) (Hungary, 1925, 110,
—6.362)
23. Hungarian—Italian Bank, Ltd. Mortgage Loan AC (Hungary, 1928, *1.,
—20.012)
24. Irish FreeState (Ireland, 1927, 115.,5.232)
25. Fiat (Italy, 1926, *10., 7.732)
26. Italian Credit Consortiu. for Public Works (Secured 8') (Italy, 1927,
17.5., 4.821)
27. Terna First Mortgage for Hydro—Elrctric A (Italy, 1928, $12m,4.572)
28.City of Bergen (Norway, 1930, 11.9m, 5.712)
29. Norwegian Hydro-Electric Nitrogen Corp. (Refunding 'A) (Norway, 3927,
120.,6.192)
30.Land Mortgage Bank of Warsaw Guaranteed First Mortgage (Poland, 1924,
115., 0.762)
31. Swedish Government (Sweden, 1924, 130., 5.572)
32. Republic of Cuba Public Works Certificate (Cuba, 1929, *9.75m, 4.632)
33.National Bank of Panama(Panama, 1926, 11., 5.192)
34. 6overnment of the Argentine Nation (Argentina, 1925, 145., 6.572)
35. Province of Buenos Aires (Argentina, 1930, *3., 4.652)
36. Province of Tucuman (Argentina, 1927, 12.1225m, 7.542)
37. Pan-American Independent Corp. First Lien Collateral Trust Loan
(Argentina, 1927, *3., —26.452)38. Sat. of Paran. (Brazil, 1928, $4.86.,1.931)
39.Stat. of Baa Paula Sscurid Loan (Brazil, 1925, 15.,3.611)
40. Republic of Chile (ChIle, 1925, $27.5., 2.521)
41.NortgagiBank of ChileGuaranteedAgriculturalNotsi(Chile,1926,
$10., 2.371)
42. Ripubllc of Coloabla (Colo.bla, 1928, 135., 3.921)
43. D.part..nt of CaldasSecuredLoan (tolosbIa, 1926, *10., 2.981)
44. City of laranquill. Stcured Loan 'C (Colo.bla, 1926, 10.5., 5.041)
45. AgrIcultural Norgag. lank Suarantp.d Loan (Colo.bia, 1927, *3., 3.501)
46. Mortgage Bank of Colo.bla (Coloabla, 1927, *4., 5.181)
47.Republic of Uruguay (Uruguay, 1926, 130., 4.961)
48.City of Brisbane (Australia, 1927, 17.51 5.461)
49. City of ToIIo (sac) (Japan, 1927, 120.61., 5.821)
50.Toho Electric Power Corp. Ltd. First Mortgage A' (Japan, 1927, *15.,
7.571)
Borrowingcountry, yearofissue, face value of issue incillioniCs) of
dollars, andesti.atedInternal rate of return appear in par.ntheies.Table A3
List of Colonial and Foreign Government Sterling_Bonds
Used In Rate Of Return_Calculation
1. 1923 Sudan Govt 4 1/2% Guaran. Stk [R 1/1/731
3,763,400 IP 93 LT 1 IRR 4.91 (4.97)*
2. 1923 Roumanian 4 % External Loan of 1922
[P. 19801 2,500,000, IP 67 LT 5 IRE.4.68
3. 1923 Rangoon (City of) 5 1/2% Debentures {R 1/9/53]
300,000 1P 98 1/2 LT 3 IRR 5.784
4. 1923 Union of South African Govt. 5% Inscribed Stk
[R 15/1/341 130O0,O00 IP 99 1/2; LT 2 IRR 8.14
5. 1923 South Australia Govt. 5% Registered Stk
[C 15/3/341 5,650,300 iP 99. LT 2, IRR 5.08
6. 1924 Amsterdam (City of) 5 1/2% String Loan 1924
[R 1/10/351 2,500,000, IP 96 1/2; LT 4 IRR6.13
7. 1924 Czechoslovak 8% Strlng Loan of 1922 (series B)
[R 31/12/601 2,050,000; IP 96 1/2; LT 5; IRE.8.41
(8.49)*
8. 1924 (L) Greek Govt. 7% Refugee Loan of 1924
[Serviced] 10,000,000; IP 88; LT 5; IRE. 2.76
9. 1925 (L) Danzig (Municipality) 7% String Bonds of 1925
[R 1/8/761 1,500,000; IP 90; LT 4; IRR4.79(6.32)*
10. 1925 South Africa (Union of) 5% Inscribd Stk
R 10/10/41] 23,000,000; IP 99 1/2; LT 2; IRR 5.14
11. 1925 Gold Coast Govt. 4 1/2% Inscribed Stk
[R 1/1/561 4,628,000; IP 94; LT 2; IRE.4.75
12. 1926 Chilean Govt. 6% Loan 1926
[R 1/2/78] 2,809,000 IP 94; LT 5 IRR 1.03 (2.70)*
13. 1926 New Zealand Govt. 5% Inscribed Stk 1946
[R 1/1/46] 12,893,925 IP 98 1/2. LT 2, IRR 5.01
14. 1926 Westphalia (Province) 7% String loan of 1926
{R 15/7/711 835,000 IP 98 1/2; LT 5; IRR 4.08
15. 1926 Hamburg (State of) 6% String Bonds of 1926
[R 1/10/71] 2,000,000 IP 93 1/2 LT 5; IRR 2.89
(3.25)*16. 1926 Newfoundland Govt. 5% Bonds 1951
[C 19/11/34] l,027,300 99; LT 2; IRR 5.218
17. 1927 Port Elizabeth Corp. 5% Redeemable Stk 1962
ER 30/6/62] 350,000; IF 99; LT 3; IRR 5.27
18. 1927 State of Rio de Janeiro 7% String Bonds
[Serviced] 1,891,000; IP 97; LT 5; IRR 1.14
19. 1927 (L) Free City of Danzig 6 1/2% Twenty—Year String
Bonds [R 1/8/76] 1,900,000; IF 91; LT 5; IRR 1.94
(4 .05)'
20. 1927 City of Santos (Brazil) 7% Consolidated
String loan [Serviced] 2,260,000; IF 97: LT 4
IRR 1.73
21. 1927 Govt. Commonwealth of Australia 5% Registered Stk
[C 1/5/45] 72,114,734; IF 97 1/2; LT 2; IRR 5.83
22. 1928 City of Wellington 5% Debentures
ER 1/3/50] 63,000; IP 98; LT 3; IRR 5.29
23. 1928 Govt. New Zealand 4 1/2% Inscribed Stk
ER 1/11/47] 11,224,998; IP 94 1/2; LT 2; IRR 4.91
24. 1928 Govt. Newfoundland 5% Bonds 1953
[C 19/11/341 2,055,400; IP 100; LT 2; IRR 5.0
25. 1928 City of Cologne 6% 25—Year String Bonds
ER 31/10/731 1,150,000; IF 95 1/2; LT 4; IRR 2.35
(3.10)*
26. 1928 City of Munich 6% String Bonds
[R 1/12/73] 1,625,000; IP 94; LT 4; IRR 1.77 (4.02)*
27. 1929 City of Abo (Finland) 30—Year 6 1/2%
String Bonds [R 1/4/39] 500,000; IP 94 1/2; LT 4;
IRR 7.37
28. 1930 City of Hobart 6% Debentures 1940
[R 1/5/40] 85,000; IF 100; LT 3; IRR 6.19
29. 1930 Japanese Govt. 5 1/2% Conversion loan 1930
ER 1/1/70] 12,500,000; IF 90; LT 5; IRR 5.45 (5.83)*
30. 1930 Austrian Govt. International Loan 1930 7% String
Bonds [R 1/7/79] 3,500,000; IF 95; LT 5; IRR 3.83
(4.05)*
31. 1930 City of Bioemfontein 5% Inscribed Stk 1960
ER 31/12/60] 500,000; IF 101; LT 3; IRR 4.92Each loan is accompanied by the following information:
Date of issue
Title
Redemption date [R...] or date of conversion [C..] or still
being serviced [Serviced]
Total face value of issue in pounds sterling
Issue price IP (par value always 100)
Loan Type (LT)
(1) British Funds
(2) Dominion, Provincial and Colonial Govt. Secutities
(3) Corporation Stocks— Dominion, Indian and Colonial
(4) Corporation Stocks—Foreign
(5) Foreign Stocks, Bonds, etc.
Internal rate of return, in %
*Repaymentsof principal outstanding can be undertaken
by purchases at or under par or by drawings at par. The
figure within brackets assumes annual repayments, of
principle, are made at par. The other assumes repayments at
market price, if less than par, otherwise at par.Data Appendix
The macroeconomic data used in our cross—section analysis are drawn
froma variety of sources.While problems of comparability between the
statistics of different countries willbe familiar to many readers, who
areused to interpreting the results of international cross sections
withspecial care, an additional cautionary word is in order. A number
of the series used here, notably the national income accounts and price
deflators, must be regarded as approximations. We have attempted
therefore to maintain a provisional tone in interpreting the results.
Major series are as follows.
National Income Gross domestic product is used wherever possible. For
Europeestimates are drawn from Mitchell (1976). Data for South America
can be found in CEPAL (1978) and for Central America in Thorp (1984).
Constantprice series for Latin America were adjusted to current prices
using Wilkie (1974). The series for Japan is from Mitchell (1982) and
for Australia from Butlin (1977).
Balance of Trade Special trade, which excludes gold and silver bullion
and specie. The value of imports and exports for the majority of
European countries is from Mitchell (1976). For Austria, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latin America, Australia and Japan, figures are
from the League of Nations publications on trade and payments listed at
the end of this appendix.
40Terms of TradeImportunit values divided by export unit values,
normalized to 1929=100 and drawn from sources described above.
Population From League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks.
Central Government Revenue and Expenditure For Europe, from Mitchell
(1976). For other countries, from League of Nations Statistical
Yearbooks.
Exchange Rates From League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks. Where
both market rates and official rates were reported, market rates were
used. For Spain, the Burgos rate was used because it exhibited more
variability than the Madrid rate.
PricesFewreliable consumer price indices are available for this
period. The wholesale price index was used where available while
composite price indices were used for certain Latin American countries.
These indices are drawn from League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks,
except for Central America, data for which is from Thorp (1984).
Money Supply and Gold The only comparable monetary measure is total
central bank note (and, where available, coin) circulation, from
Mitchell (1976), except for Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Latin America, Australia and Japan, in which cases it is drawn from
League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks. Gold reserves are drawn from
these same sources.
41Debt and Debt Service Domestic and external debt, along with total and,
where available, external debt service (interest plus amortization) were
drawn from League of Nations Statistical Yearbooks. These are end—of—
year figures. Where Statistical Yearbooks provide no information, data
aredrawn from the League's Memoranda on Public Finance.
Default and ArrearsData on these variables are found, for sterling
bonds,in the Reports of the Council of the Corporation of Foreign
Bondholdersand, for dollar bonds, in the Annual Reports of the Foreign
Bondholders Protective Council.
The following countries were included in the cross—section analysis
of borrowing: Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico,
Australia, Japan, Honduras, Ecuador, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,Spain, Sweden,
Guatemala, and El Salvador.
The following countries wereincluded in the cross—section analysis
ofdefault: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia,Mexico, Australia, Japan, Chile, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Costa
Rica, and El Salvador.
42Sources and Documents Cited in Data Appendix
Butlin, M.W. (1977), A Preliminary Annual Database 1900/01 to 1973/74,
Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia.
CEPAL (1978), Series Historicas del Crecimiento de America Latina,
CEPAL.
Council of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (various years),
Report, London: Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (various years), Annual Report,
New York: Foreign Bondholders Protective Council.
League of Nations (various years), Statistical Yearbook, Geneva: League
of Nations.
League of Nations (various years), Memorandum on Public Finance, Geneva:
League of Nations.
League of Nations (various years), Review of World Trade, Geneva: League
of Nations.
League of Nations (various years), Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade
Balances, Geneva: League of Nations.
43Mitchell, B.R. (1976), EuropeanHistoricalStatistics, London:
Macmillan.
_______(1982),International Historical Statistics: Africa and
Asia, London: Macmillan.
Thorp, Rosemary (ed.) (1984), Latin America in the 1930s, London:
Macmillan.
Wilkie, J. (1974), Statistics andNationalPolicy, Los Angeles: UCLA.
44Footnotes
1.65.1% to be exact. These figures are from Lewis (1945), pp. 48—50.
Note that foreign investment in the U.S. and U.K. has not been netted
out from the totals. Since the ratio of long—term liabilities to assets
was 61% forthe U.S.but only 5% for the U.K., nettingout inward
investment would change the picture somewhat for the U.S. but not the
U.K.While these statistics are the best available, they are not
withouttheir limitations. The most serious is the omission of short—
termlending, on which adequate information is not available. Although
Lewis (1945, p.7) warns that some direct investments may simply have
been missed in compiling the totals, a more serious source of bias is
likely to be the fact that bonds are valued at par. This is problematic
for bonds in default which traded at a considerable discount. On the
other hand, the market value of many direct investments was considerably
above book value in 1938. For Britain at least, Lewis suggests, the two
sources of error roughly cancel out.
2. These traditional figures have been criticized by Platt (1984) for
making unduly conservative assumptions about the repatriation of foreign
funds and hence for overestimating the value of outstanding stocks. But
if the required adjustments would moderate the apparent dominance of
overseas assets in British portfolios, they would still fail to alter
the picture of Britain's prewar dominance in international capital
markets.
453. Long—term assets only, from Lewis (1945), are included in the
numerator, while Feinstein's (1972) estimate of GNP at market prices
comprises the denominator.
4. In the case of nongovernmental lending, just over half the total
took the form of bonds and sligher under half the form of shares. These
figures from Royal Institute (1937) are based on calculations by Robert
Kindersley, published annually in the Economic Journal.
5 The Colonial Stock Act enabled certain trusts to invest in the bonds
of colonial but not foreign governments. If a trust was not governed by
specific instructions about assets in which to invest, statute limited
foreign investments to East India stock, English corporations with
direct foreign investments, guaranteed Indian railways, and registered
and inscribed stocks of colonial governments. The importance of these
restrictions has been questioned on the grounds that the vast majority
of trusts were in fact governed by specific instructions and defended on
the grounds that in the 1920s foreign governments and municipalities
which attempted to borrow in London were forced to pay at least 1 1/2%
and up to 2 1/2% more than comparable entities within the Empire. See
Edeistein (1981), p.83.
6. Foreign asset estimates are those of Lewis (1945), while GNP is from
U.S. Department of Commerce (1976).If Dunn's (1926, p.3) estimates of
foreign assets are preferred, the ratio is still lower.
467. For information on the composition of U.S. portfolio investment
circa 1930, see Royal Institute (1937), p.189.
8. Considerations other than proximity also influenced the
international distribution of American loans. Before the War, for
example, investment in the West Indies and northern portions of Latin
America was actively promoted by the State Department as a way of
minimizing European financial influence in the region. See Angell
(1933).
9.This "cross—over point," after which the debt—service obligations of
foreign borrowers exceed the value of new lending, is given considerable
emphasis in recent accounts of sovereign borrowing in the 1980s.
According to Kaletsky (1985, Table 2.1), the recent cross—over point was
1982—83. Note that the reason the gross outflow in Table 1 appears to
turn negative in 1937 and 1940 is that American direct foreign
investment is included on a net basis, since these are the only
estimates available.
10. Of course, the two explanations for the stagnation of British
capital exports are not incompatible, since restrictions on capital
exports were imposed largely to strengthen the exchange rate and ease
the transition back to the prewar parity. See Moggridge (1971).Short
descriptions of these regulations and their changing nature are provided
by Richardson (1936) and Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983).
4711. Her liabilities were split approximately 60—40 between the U.S. and
U.K. and between portfolio and direct investment. See Lewis (1945).
12. These data are described in the appendix.
13. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), p.302.
14. Before dismissing Edwards's hypothesis, one should note the
possibility that gold stocks are an inadequate measure of reserves.
15. This 40% figure refers to consumption of nine major commodities.
See Lewis (1949), p.57. While the share of imports in GNP was not high
by modern standards, the sheer size of the American economy still
permitted changes in an import share which was low on average to
affect world markets powerfully on the margin. See the discussion in
Dornbusch and Fischer (1984).
16. Industrial production figures are from Tinbergen (1934), while GDP
estimatesare those reported in U.S. Department of Commerce (1976).
17.Taylor and Taylor (1943), pp. 10—12.
18.These figures overstate the change in the terms of trade, since
U.S. wholesale prices were falling as well (by 9% on average between
1929 and 1930, according to Tinbergen (1934), p.212).
19. These are the calculations of Summers and Delong (1984), p.53.
4820. See for example the well—known studies of Feder and Just (1977) and
Feder, Just and Ross (1981). The debt—capacity literature is surveyed
by McDonald (1982). A recent discussion of the costs and benefits of
default from the policymaker's perspective is provided by Diaz—Alejandro
(1984).
21. For details, see the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council's
Annual Report for 1934.
22. The two notable instances of repudiation in this period are a
partial repudiation by the Mexican government in 1914 and the Soviet
government's repudiation of debt contracted by the Czarist and Kerensky
regimes.
23. These two denominations of debt comprise the very great majority of
the total. Only dollar— and sterling—denominated debt are considered
because, while the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council provides
information on the former and the British Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders on the latter, information on the status of debt denominated
in other currencies is much more difficult to obtain. Details on these
data can be found in the Data Appendix.
24. The two—limit probit model is a generalization of the Tobit model
to the case where the data is censored at both tails. Rosett and Nelson
(1975) provide a description of the estimator.
4925. Estimates based on data for individual years are entirely
consistent with the pooled time—series cross—section results discussed
in the text, although statistically less well defined, due presumably to
limited degrees of freedom.
26. For further discussion of Australian policy toward gold reserves in
this period, see Eichengreen (1985). Another possible explanation for
the sign of the monetary variable is simultaneity bias —thatcountries
which defaulted then capitalized on the opportunity to promote recovery
via monetary expansion. However, most of the movement in this variable
takes place before the second half of 1931, when the serious defaults
began. Moreover, replacing this variable with the gold/currency ratio
over the period 1928—30 does not alter the result.
27. To maintain their good reputations, the issuing houses supposedly
had an interest in insuring that the prospectus contained accurate
information. Committee on Finance and Industry (1931), paragraph 387.
28. "These agents for the first time taught the small investor in a
hundred small provincial towns, and in the countryside of the Middle and
Far West, to link their fortunes with those of the Governments and
enterprises of distant lands whose very names he often scarcely knew.
It was an astonishing achievement of modern organisation, and for its
first purpose of inducing the investor to lend his money, and making
this money available in the continents which most needed capital, it was
extremely successful. But, as we shall see, at the other end of the
operation, namely the examination of the character and purposes of the
50loan, the capacity of the borrower and the likelihood of his using the
money productively, the methods adopted were less satisfactory. There
was too much competition and too little caution." Salter (1933), pp.99—
100. Compare the anecdotal accounts of lending in the 1980s reported in
Darity (1985).
29. Similarly, 80 to 90% of dollar bond purchasers in the 1920s took no
more than $5000, with 45 to 65% of the total value of an issue typically
taken by this category of buyer. These amounts need to be multiplied by
six to express them in mid—1980s prices. The figures reported are based
mainly on a survey of 24 representative American bond houses conducted
in 1924—26. See Morrow (1927) for details. Estimates of the average
value of holdings of Chilean bonds are from the Annual Report for 1935
of the Council of Foreign Bondholders, p.99.
30. In the 1970s, this situation was altered. The U.S. Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and the U.K. State Immunity Act of 1978
distinguished a nation's commercial activities from its acts as a
sovereign power. This legislation established the legal liability of
foreign governments for purely commercial acts and permitted such
governments to waive their immunities from litigation. The effect of
these acts has, however, been questioned. See Kaletsky (1985), chapter
4. Even in the 1920s, the situation was different for loans to
nongovernmental entities. Loan contracts for private foreign bond
issues were nominally subject to the laws of place of performance, not
those of foreign debtor. Disputes over private loans floated in New
York or London were therefore heard in American or British courts.
51Thus, when in 1934 two German shipping companies contended that they
were precluded from complying with the terms of their loan contracts by
German exchange control, the U.S. District Court in New York ruled that
"..As the contracts were made here and were to be performedhere, the
German law relative to performance is of no legal significance in the
courts of this country." Madden et al. (1937), p.282. However, such
jurisdiction as American or British courts claimed over foreign private
debtors was usually of little significance. In practice, creditors
could use a legal decision to obtain satisfaction only if the defendant
had attachable assets abroad. Not surprisingly, the notable instances
where arrears were paid in full or an acceptable readjustment planwas
offered involved shipping companies, like those cited above, with
attachable assets anchored in American ports.
31. See Securities and Exchange Commission (1936), vol. IV,pp. 28—29.
32. Securities and Exchange Commission (1936), vol. IV, p.25. Thisnew
restraint was ascribed to the adoption of a more balanced attitude by
the major powers. Royal Institute (1937), p.99. A more pragmatic
interpretation is that, however effective against an isolated debtor,
gunboat diplomacy was an impractical response to (geographically)
widespread default.
33. See Harris (1935).
34. Madden et al. (1937), pp. 267—268.
5235. The treatment of these bondholders is described in the Fifth Annual
Report of the Bank for International Settlements. On State Department
protests, see Securities and Exchange Commission (1936), vol IV, p.24.
Whether American restraint is attributable to principle or to the fact
that the U.S. ran trade deficits against few of the defaulting nations
(Brazil, Colombia and Cuba being the notable exceptions), U.S. policy of
delinking the trade and debt issues clearly influenced the course of
negotiations. In its negotiations with Colombia, for example, the
bondholders' representatives threatened that failure to settle would
cause the adoption of increased tariffs on Colombia coffee. (See the
1934 Annual Report of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, p.95.)
Knowing U.S. policy, the Colombians appear to have discounted the
threat. As Colombian President Lopez put it, "this threat does not
modify in any way the intent of the Colombian Government to study
quietly the best plan to meet the external obligations of the
Republic..." Securities and Exchange Commission (1936), vol. IV,
pp. 378—379.
36. See also Sachs (1983).
37. U.S. Senate (1932), vol. II, pp. 749—750.
38. U.S. Senate (1932), vol. II, pp. 288—289.
39. Jenks (1927), pp. 288—289.
5340. There had been two notable attempts to form central protective
agencies in the United States: the nonprofit Latin American Bondholders
Association incorporated in New York in 1931, which failed after
managing to secure only $515 in membership fees, and the for—profit
American Council of Foreign Bondholders, which was only slightly more
successful in attracting subscribers.
41. Madden et al. speculate that inclusion of Canadian dollar bonds
would reduce somewhat the avarage yields shown in the table. According
to U.S. Department of Commerce (1932), p.14, the average annual yield
offered on new Canadian issues floated in the U.S. ranged from 7.03 in
1920 to 4.19 in 1931, and averaged 5.32 over the period.
42. American loan contracts, both domestic and foreign, typically
contained provisions which specified repayment in terms of "gold dollars
of the standard weight and fineness." When Roosevelt issued an
Executive Order in June 1933 abrogating the gold clause provisions of
all U.S. government bonds, setting the stage for the devaluation of the
dollar, questions arose about the treatment of analogous clauses in
other bond contracts. In following months, many foreign debtors chose
to continue to honor the gold clauses in their liabilities. Most,
however,quickly followed the American government's lead, making payment
indepreciated dollars. In thisthey were encouraged by the attitude of
theAmerican Executive itself. Creditors whose assets contained gold
clauses were characterized by the U.S. Attorney General as "a
privileged class....squatters in the public domain, and when the
Government needs the territory they must move on." (Cited in Feuerlein
54and Hannan, 1941, p.23.) Various steps were taken to relieve domestic
debtors, principally farmers, of the obligation to make repayment in
gold. Most foreign debtors took this as justification for their
decisions to make payment in current dollars.
43. Dominick and Dominick (1924—1937).
44. Issues of the Stock Exchange Yearbook were supplemented as
necessary by the Stock Exchange Daily Official List.
45. In the calculations to follow, the return on individual issues is
weighted by the value of the loan. To adjust for stratification, we
doubled the weight on each Australian issue included in the final sample
of sterling loans.
46. Most of the bonds in the sample sold at considerable discounts and
were expected to yield capital gains when redeemed at par. The most
dramatic case is the German United Industrial Corporation's Hydro-
Electric First Mortgage, a 20 year bond which sold at 84.5 per cent of
par due to its relatively low 6 per cent coupon.
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